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Abstrad
In this paper we establish necessary and suffiden[ conditions for the simultaneous
existence of an optimal income tax mechanism and an optimal vector of public goods. Moreover,
we identify a condition suff3cient to guaran[ee that the optimal mechanism is budget balanáng.
The key ingredient in our analysis is a result chazacteri7ing incentive compatible income
tax~public goods mechanisms. This result allows us to convert the tax design~public goods
problem with finanáng and incentive compatibility constraints to an equivalent design problem
without incentive compatibility constraints. Our characterization of incentive compatibility
requires only very weak assumptions concerning agents' utility functions and does not rely in
any way on the problematic first order approach. Thus, gaps and bunching are permitted.
While much of the literature restricLs optimal taxes to be in certain dasses of functions, our only
restriction on the dass ofincome tax functions is measurability.
'The authors thank Erik Balder, lawrence Blume, Kim Bordeq Jacques Dreze, Jayasri Dutta, Thomas
Cresik, John Ledyard, Tom Palfrey, Scott Page, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Hamid Sebourian, Simon Wilkie,
and sertvnar participants at Caltech, Carlos III, CORE, and Churchitl College, Cambridge for many helpful
comments. Tfus paper was completed while Page was visiting the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg
University. Page gra[efully acknowledges CentER's support and hospitality. Berliant gratefully
acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation, grant number SBR 93 ]9994.1. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), economists have used models
of optimal income taxation for policy prescriptions as well as normative
analysis of models of government behavíor. Although it is usually necessary to
employ simulations since closed form solutions to the optimal tax problem are
often unavailable, the model seems capable of yielding important insights into
tax design since it combines government optimization with individual
behavior in the context of uncertainty about the types or wage rates of agents.
The incentive compatibility constraints on the government that arise naturally
from this uncertainty place interesting and vital limits on government
behavior. Examples of the model's usefulness include Brunner (1989), Tillman
(1989), Tuomala (1990), and Weymark (1986a and b, 1987).
The model also suffers from some notable defects. First, it is generally
difficult to give necessary (or sufficïent) conditions for an optimal income tax
other than the standard condition that the top ability individual(s) face a
marginal tax rate of zero. Further properties of an optimal income tax are
derived only from simulation. Second, it is convenient to replace the
optimization problem of agents with the associated first order conditions for
optimization (the so-called first order approach to incentive compatibility)
both for analytical tractability and for simulations. Unfortunately, as L'Ollivier
and Rochet (1983) show using an example, some optimal taxes involve
bunching (having multiple types earning the same gross income) or gaps
(having no types earning some incomes), which implies that the first order
approach is not valid in the sense that a true optimal tax might not satisfy the
first order conditions. It also implies that income taxes derived using the first
order approach are not necessarily optimal, as they might violate second order
conditions for the consumer optimization problems. Berliant and Gouveia
(1994) find conditions on primitives of the optimal income tax problem
sufficient to obtain validity of the first order approach to incentive
compatibility, but these conditions are rather stringent, as they involve
additive separability of consumer utility functions and conditions on the third
derivatives.
Further problems with the model include the restriction to one-
dimensional type descriptions (agents are differentiated only by the wage rate)
and strong assumptions concerning the properties of utility functions,
1generally including normality of one or both goods, a single crossing property,
smoothness, and quasi-concavity.
In this paper we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the
simultaneous existence of an optimal income tax mechanism and an optimal
vector of public goods. More importantly, we identify a condition sufficient to
guarantee that an optimal tax mechanism can be chosen so to generate the e.ract
amount of revenue required to finance the optimal vector of public goods. Thus
an optimal tax mechanism can be chosen that is budget balancing.
Our analysis is carried out in a general setting, independent of the
validity of the first order approach to incentive compatibility, and requires
only very weak assumptions on consumer utility functions.t No single crossing
property is assumed, and utility functions need not even be quasi-concave or
have any normality property. Gaps and bunching are permitted. The techniques
employed are sufficiently general to allow for multidimensional (and even
infinite dimensional) agent type descriptions. Quinzii and Rochet (1985) found
the first order approach to such models to be exceedingly messy.
The model developed here, while similar to models found in the
principal-agent literature (e.g., Mirrlees (1976), Holmstrom (1979)), differs from
the standard principal-agent model in several important respects. First, rather
than there being a single agent, in our model there are uncountably many
agents. Second, in our model agents face no uncertainty once they have chosen
an action. In particular, each agent chooses a level of income rather than a
probability distribution over income. Finally, in our model there are no
voluntary participation (or individual rationality) constraints. These constraints
are replaced by a financing constraint which requires that the government
choose a tax mechanism that finances the public goods.
Because public goods are financed from current consumption via the
income tax, the government in choosing a vector of public goods and a tax
function must be concerned with the incentives for subsequent income
generation their choices create. In analyzing the government's tax
design~public goods problem we explicitly take into account these incentives.
Thus we formally examine the trade-off between the welfare enhancing effects
of public goods versus the adverse incentives effects of taxation.
tlJsing variauonal techniques, Brito and Oakland (1977) give necessary conditions We optimal quantity of
public goods will satisCy if financed by an optimal income tau. Besides carrying out our analysis in a more
general setUng, our focus here is upon We simultaneous existence ofan optimal tax mechanism and an
optimal quantity ofpublic goods.
2Much of the tax literature simply restricts optimal taxes to be in certain
classes of functions (e.g., a class of equicontinuous functions) to obtain the
existence of an optimum. Of course once this reslricHon is made, it is possible
that an income tax function not in this class dominates the optimum in this
class. For instance, if an optímal income tax is found in the class of
differentiable functions, it is possible that an income tax in the class of
continuous functions dominates it. If an optimal tax is found in the class of
continuous functions, it is possible that an income tax in the class of piecewise
continuous functions dominates it, and so forth. In the analysis below no
substantial restrictions are placed upon the class of income tax functions
considered. Thus, the optimal income tax function is determined by economic
considerations rather than exogenous technical restrictions.
In the work presented here, we find necessary and sufficient conditions
for the simultaneous existence of an optimal income tax mechanism and an
optimal vector of public goods. The modeling assumptions required for these
conditions to be valid are surprisingly weak - the most critical assumption
being the existence of a direct tax function and a vector of public goods
satisfying the financing constraint (i.e., the requirement that the income tax
function generate enough revenue to finance the vector of public goods). This
assumption is similar to the Slater condition in the context of mathematical
programming and can be quite easily checked in many problems.
The existence question centers on whether or not the constrained
mathematical programming problem describing the tax design~public goods
problem has a solution. Because there can be uncountably many consumer
types (i.e., wage rates), the tax design problem can have uncountably many
incentive compatibility constraints. This, of course, greatly complicates the
existence problem. The key ingredient in our analysis is a result characterizing
(multi-dimensional and even infinite dimensional) incentive compatibility that
allows us to convert the tnx design~public goods problent wit{t finnncing and incentive
compntibility consiraints to an equivnlent desigrt problern without incentive compatibility
constrnints. The existence of an optimal income tax mechanism and an optimal
vector of public goods can then be established within a very general class of
models using only classical results (e.g., a continuous function on a compact set
achieves a maximum).
Before proceeding with thP analysis, two remarks are in order. First,
while we focus on existence, we believe that the techniques developed here will
3be useful in analyzing the properties of optimal tax mechanisms and optimal
levels of public goods. Second, Kaneko (1981) proves existence of an optimal
tax in a different but related model.
In Section 2 we present the basic ingredients of the model, state the
mechanism design problem corresponding to the optimal tax~public goods
problem, and discuss efficiency. In Section 3 we discuss income~tax menus,
financing requirements, and incentive compatibility. Moreover, in Section 3 we
present our characterization of incentive compatible public sector mechanisms.
In Section 4 we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the
simultaneous existence of an optimal income tax mechanism and an optimal
vector of public goods. Finally, in Section 5 we identify a condition sufficient to
guarantee the existence of an optimal tax mechanism that generates the exact
amount of revenue required to finance the optimal vector of public goods.
42. The Framework
Bnsic Ingredients
Let Y and T denote two closed bounded intervals of Rf(the nonnegative
real numbers) such that Y-T. In particular, let Y- T- [O,m] for some large
posiHve real number m. Consider the set
K-{(y,i)EYxT:y?i]. (1)
K is the set of allfensible income and tax liability pairs in Y x T. Equipped with
the standard Euclidean metric, de( ,.), K is compact.
Now let G be a compact subset of Rt, and let z-(z~,...,zk) denote a
typical element in G. Each vector z is a vector of public goods. For each vector z
of public goods, let c(z) denote the (nonnegative) cost of providing public
goods z. In the model we develop here, the cost public goods will be financed
from consumption via the tax mechanism.
Denote by W the set of agent types, usually catled ability or wage rates
in the literature, and equip W with a a- field E and a probability measure P(.)
defined on E. For E e E, P(E) is the fraction of the total number of agents that
are of type w e E.
Finally, for each agent type w E W, let u(w,.,.,.) : K x G-~ R denote the
agent's utility function defined over 3-tuples of income, tax liability, and public
goods, (y,2,z) e K xG. We will assume the following concerning agents' utility
functions:
[A-1]: (1) For each w e W, u(w,.,.,.) is continuous on K xG, and for
each (y,ti,z)EKxG, u(.,y,T,z) is E-measurable.
(2) For each (w,y,z) e W x Y x G, u(w, y,.,z) is strictly decreasing
on K(y) -{t :(y, T) e K] (i.e., íf T and t' are in K(y) and t ~ T',
then u(w,y,t',z)~u(w,y,t,z)).
EXAMPLE 1:
Suppose agents have preferences defined over nonnegative values for
consumption c, labor V, and public goods z represented by a continuous uHlity
5function, v(P,c,z) which is strictly increasing in consumption. Suppose also that
agents differ by an ability parameter, w, strictly positive which can be
interpreted as a wage rate or productivity. In particular, let W-[L, H] c Rtt
denote the set of all possible ability parameters and equip W with the Borel a-
field. Finally, suppose that for each income and tax liability pair (y,t)eK,
labor is given by P- Y, and consumption by c- y- 2. The utility function
w
u(.,.,.,.) given by u(w,y,2,z)-v(W,y-t,z) satisfies [A-1](7) and (2).
We will also assume the following concerning the cost of providing
public goods:
[A-2] The cost function c(.) : G~ Rf is lower semicontinuous.2
The Tax Design Problem with Public Goods
As in Berliant and Gouveia (7994), we assume that the government does
not know each agent's type but can observe each agent's income and thus
deduce (the resulting) tax liability.
To begin, let It(.) be a countably additive finite measure defined on the
measurable space of agent types (W,E), equivalent to the probability measure
P(-).3 The measure u(.) represents one possible welfare weighting scheme for
agent types.
Now let M(W,Y) denote the set of all (E,B(Y))-measurable functions
y(.) : W~ Y, M(Y,T) the set of all (B(Y),B(T))-measurable functions
t(.) : Y~ T, and M(W,G) the set of all (E,B(G))-measurable functions
z(.): W~ G:t The lt-tax design problem with public goods is stated as follows:
2c(-) : G-~ Rt is lower semicontinuous if zn -a z implies lim infn c(zn)? c(z) .
3It and P aze equivalen[ if they have the same sels of ineasure zero. Thus It and P are
equivalen[ if It is absolutely continuous wi[h respect to P and P is absolutely continuous with
resped to It.
}Here, B(Y) denotes the Borel a-6eld in Y, B(T) the Borel v-field in T, and B(G) the Borel a-
field in G. A fundion y(.) : W-i Y is (i, B(Y))-measurable iff {w e W :y(w) e E} E i for




subject to the constraints
(y(.),t(.),z(.)) e M(W,Y) x M(Y,T) x M(W,G),
the function z(-) is everywhere constant and
equal to some z E G,
for each w e W,
u(w,y(w),t(Y(w)),z(w))? u(w,y,t(Y),z(w'))




0 5 t(y) 5 y for all y e Y, (6)
j(t(y(w))- c(z(w)))dP(w) ? 0.
W
We will refer to any y(.) e M(W,Y) as a direct income function (since it is
defined on types) and any t(.) e M(Y,T) as an indirect tax function (since it is
defined on income rather than types). We will also refer to any function
z(-)eM(W,G) as a direct public goods function. Since the consumption of
public goods must be the same for all agents, the feasible set of direct public
goods functions consists of constant functions (as specified in (4)). We will refer
to any pair of functions (y(-),t(.))eM(W,Y)xM(Y,T) as an income tax
mechanism and to any 3-tuple of functions
(y(.), t(. ),z(. )) e M(W,Y) x M(Y, T) x M(W,G), (8)
as a public sector mechanism.
The constraints given by (5) are the incentive compatibility constraints.
Note that there can be uncountably many incentive compatibility constraints.
Denote by `Y the subset of public sector mechanisms (y(-),t(.),z(.)) satisfying
the incentive compatibility constraints ioifh z(-) a constantfernction.
The constraint given by (6) is a feasibility constraint requiring that the
indirect tax function be such that for all income levels taxes be nonnegative and
7not exceed income. Denote by T' the subset of public sector mechanisms
(y(.),t(-),z(.)) with t(.) satisfying the feasibility constraint.
The constraint given by (7) is the financing constraint. It requires that
any public sector mechanism (y(.),t(.),z(.)) be such that the total tax revenues
generated by the income tax mechanism (y(.),t(.)) be sufficient to cover the cost
of providing public goods z(-). Denote by I7 the subset of public sector
mechanisms (y(-),t(.),z(.)) satisfying the financing constraint.
Definition 1
We say that the public sector mechanism (y(.),t(.),z(.)) implements the indirect
tax function t(.) and finances public goods z(.) if and only if
(Y(.), t(.),z(.)) e`Y n I' n Il .
Efficiency
We begin with a definition.
Definition 2
We say that a public sector mechanism (y(.),t(.),z(.)) e`Y n i' n II is efficient if
and only if there does not exist another public sector mechanism
(v(.),t'(.),z'(~)) e`P n T' n iI such that




for some E E E with P(E) ~ 0.
The following Proposition gives sufficient conditions for efficiency. The
proof is straightforward.
Proposition 1
If the mechanism (y(-), t(.),z(-)) e Y' n T' n i] solves the design problem ((2)-(~)
for some finite measure u equivalent to the probability measure P, then
(y(.),t(.),z(.)) is efficient.
83. Menus, Mechanisms, and Revenue Requirements
Menus nnd Direct Public Sector Mechnnisrns
One way to approach the public sector design problem is to view the
problem as an optimal delegation problem (e.g., see Holmstrom (1984) or Page
(1992)). Viewing the problem in this way, the government simply chooses a
menu of public goods and a menu of income and tax liability pairs from some
feasible collection of inenus and delegates the choice of public goods
consumption and the choice of an income and tax liability pair to the agents.
There are two problems that must be overcome, however, in order for the
delegation approach to the public sector design problem to be valid. First, a
feasible collection of inenus must be identified that is consistent with the
constraints in the design problem. Second, the menu design problem must be
shown to be equivalent to the mechanism design problem. In the analysis to
follow we will show that both of these difficulties can be 2asilv overcome.
To begin, let Pf(K) denote the collection of all nonempty closed subsets
of K(where as before, K is the set of all feasible income and tax liability pairs
in Y x T), and equip Pf(K) with the Hausdorff inetric h. To accomplish this,
define de(s',C) - infsEC dB(s',s) where s' -(y',T) and s-(y,2) are income~tax
payment pairs in K and C e Pf(K). The Hausdorff inetric h is then given by
h(A,B) - max{sups~ d~(s,B),supsEB dq(s,A)} for A, B in Pl-(K) .
Since K is a compact metric space, Pf(K) equipped with the Hausdorff inetric is
also a compact metric space (Berge (1963)).
Convergence in (Pt-(K),h) can be characterized as follows. Let {Cn}n be a
sequence in Pf(K) and define Li(Cn) as follows: se Li(Cn) if and only if there
is a sequence {sn}n in K such that for each n sn eCn and limnsn -s. Now
define Ls(Cn ) as follows: s e Ls(Cn ) if and only if there is a subsequence (sn~ }~
in K such that for each j sn~ eCn~ and lim~sn~ - s. A subset of income~tax
liability pairs Ce Pf(K) is said to be the limit of (Cn}n if Li(Cn)-C-Ls(Cn).
Moreover, h(Cn,C) ~ 0(i.e., the sequence (Cn}n converges to C e Pf(K) under
the Hausdorff inetric h) if and only if Li(Cn) -C - Ls(Cn).
9Since the government cannot control or restrict the agent's income
choice, any menu C e Pf(K) chosen by the government must be such that
projl,(C)-Y, where projY(C) denotes the projection of the closed set
C c Y x T onto Y. Hence menu choice must be restricted to the set A, where
A-{C e Pf(K): projY (C) - Y}. (12)
The set A is nonempty (e.g., take the 45 degree line in the square Y x T)
and closed with respect to the Hausdorff inetric h(i.e., A is h-closed).5 Thus,
(A, h) is a compact metric space.
Now let Pf(G) denote the collection of all nonempty closed subsets of
G c R~, the feasible set of public goods vectors, and equip Pf(G) with the
Hausdorff inetric h. Since G is compact, (Pf(G),h) is also a compact metric
space. In the case of public goods consumption, the public goods consumption
choice for each agent must be the same (see expression (4) in the design
problem (2)-(~). In order to capture this constraint in the menu problem, let S
denote the collection of all singleton sets (i.e., H e S if and only if H-{z) for
some z in G). The collection of single-element menus S is an h-closed subset of
Pf(G). Thus, (S,h) too is a compact metric space.
Given a particular pair of inenus (C,H)e AxS chosen by the
government, the resulting choice problem for agents is given by
max(y 2,z)eCxH "(``''y'2,z).
(13)
Since C x H c K x G is compact, for each agent type w e W, this problem has a
solution. Let




Sln particular, it is easy to show that if {Cn }n c A converges to C E Pf(K) under the h melric,
then projY(C)-Y.
10Given menus (C,H)eAxS, u"(w,C,H) is the optimal level of utility
attainable by a type w agent, while ~(w,C,H) is the set of income, tax liability,
and public goods 3-tuples from which the type w agent must choose in order to
attain utility level u"(w,C,H). Thus, the mapping w-~d~(w,C,H) is a best
response mapping.
Proposition 2
(1) u" (w,., ) is continuous on A x S for each w e W(with respect to the
product metric) and u"(.,C,H) is E-measurable on W for each
(C,I'17EAXS.
(2) ~(w,C, H) c K x G is nonempty and compact for each
(w,C, H) E W x A x S. Moreover, ~(w,.,-) is upper semicontinuous on
A x S for each w e W(with respect to the product metric) and ~(.,.,-)
is E x B(A) x B(S)-measurable on W x A x S 5
Proposition 2 essentialty summarizes the contents of Propositions 4.1
and 4.2 in Page (1992).
By the Kuratowski, Ryll-Nardzewski Theorem (see Theorem 5.l in
Himmelberg (1975)), given any pair of inenus (C,H) E A x S there exists a
(E,B(Y) x B(T) x B(G))-measurable function7 w~(y(w),T(w),z(w)) such that
(y(w),T(w),z(w)) e~(w,C,H) for all w e W, (16)
and thus such that for all w E W,
u(w,Y(w),t(w),z(w)) - u"(w,C,I~ - max(y 2,z)eCxH u(w,y,2,z).
(17)
6Here B(A) denotes the Borel 6-field in the compact melric space (A, h) and B(S) the Bore] a-
field in [he compact melric spare (S, h). ~( ,,) is E x B(A) x B(S)-measurable iff for each closed
subset E of Y x T x G, ((w, C, H) e W x A x 5:~(w, C, H) n E~ PJ) e E x 6(A) x B(S) (see
Himmelherg (1975)).
7Thc function w~(y(w),t(w),z(w)) is (i, B(Y) x B(T) x B(G))-measurahle iff w -~ y(w) is
(E, B(Y))-measurahle, w~ t(w) is (E, B(T))-measurable, and w~ z(w) is (i,B(G))-
measurahle (see Dudley (1989)).
11In fact, it is easy to show that any 3-tuple of functions
(Y(-),t(.),z(-)) E M(E,Y) x M(E,T) x M(E,G) (18)
satisfying (16), satisfies for each w and w' in W the inequality
u(w,y(w),i(w),z(w))? u(w,Y(w"),T(w"),z(w')). (19)
Thus, any 3-tuple of ineasurable funcHons (y(-),t( ),z(-)) satisfying (16) is an
incentive compatible, direct public sector mechanism corresponding to the pair
of inenus (C,H) e A x S. Moreover, given any incentive compatible direct
public sector mechanism (y(-),T(.),z(.)) corresponding to the menus
(C,H) e A x S, we have for each w e W
u(w, Y(w), T(w),z(w)) - u(w,y, 2,z) frrrall (y,T,z) e~(w, C,H) .
(20)
Finally, given any pair of inenus (C,H) e A x S and any 3-tuple of
measurable functions (y(.),t(-),z(.)) satisfying (16) , we have for some z in G
z(w) - z for all w e W(recall that H-(z) for some z in G).
We will take as the set of all possible direct public sector mechanisms, the
set of all 3-tuples
(Y(~),T(~),z(~)) e M(E,Y) x M(E,T) x M(E,G).
Moreover, given any direct public sector mechanism (y(.),t(.),z(.)), we will
refer to y(.) as the direct income function (as before), Z(.) as the direct tax
function, and z(.) as the direct public goods function (as before).
Menus and Revenue Requirements
A pair of inenus (C, H) e A x S is revenue feasible if the set-valued
mapping w ~~(w,C,H) has a measurable selection (y(.),T(-),z(.)) such that




The quantity a(w,C,H) is the maximum amount of tax surplus obtainable from
a type w agent consistent ~~ith incentive compatibility given menus
(C,H)eAxS.Since ~(w,C,H)cKxG is nonempty and compact, a(w,C,H) is
well-defined for each (w,C,H) e W x A x S. Now consider the real-valued




(1) a( ,-,.) is E x B(A) x B(S)-measurable and for each w e W, 6(w,.,.) is
upper semicontinuous on A x S. Moreover, for each pair of inenus
(C,H) e A x S, there exists a measurable selection (y(.),t(.),z(.)) from
~(.,C,H) suchthat T(w)-c(z(w))-a(w,C,H) for all we W.
(2) The mapping (C,H) ~ A(C,H) is upper semicontinuous on A x S.
PROOF: (1) Notíng that the function (2,z)-i T-c(z) is upper semicontinuous,
the first part of (1) follows directly from ProposiHon 4.3 in Page (1992). The
second part follows from the Kuratowski, Ryll-Nardzewski Theorem.
(2) Since (C, H) --~ a(w,C,H) is upper semicontinuous on A x S for each w e W,
it follows from Fatou's Lemma that (C,H)~A(C,H) is upper semicontinuous
on A x S(see Dudley (1989)). Q.E.D.
Let
R-(íC,I-I)E AXS:A(C,I-~?0}.
R is the set of all revenue feasible menu pairs. In particular, for (C,H) e R,
Ja(w,C, H)dP(w) ? 0,
W
(24)
13and by part (1) of Proposition 3 there is a measurable selection (y(.),T(.),z(.))
from di(.,C,H) such that 2(w)-c(z(w))-a(w,C,H) for all we W. Thus, for this
measurable selection
J (T(w) -c(z(w)))dP(w) ? 0.
W
We will assume that
[A-3] R ~ fd.
Proposition 4
R is a closed subset of the compact metric space A x S.
PROOF: The result follows directly from the definition of upper semicontinuity
and the fact that (C,H) -~ A(C,H) is h-upper semicontinuous. Q.E.D.
EXAMPLE 2:
Suppose Y x T-[0,5] x[0,5] and G-[0,2]. Suppose also that agents' ability
parameter, w, is distributed uniformly on the closed interval W-[4,5], and
that agents have preferences defined over nonnegative values for consumption
c, labor Q, and public goods z represented by a conHnuous utility function,
vE(-,.,.):[0,1]x[0,5]x[0,2J~R, given by
~E(Q,c.z)-(1-PfE)-(cfE).(Zf-1),
where e~ 0 is a small positive number.g LetHng 2- y and c- y- T, we have
w
then uE (.,.,.,.) :[4,5] x K x[0, 2] -i R given by
uE(w,y,i,z)-(1- W fe).(y-zfe).(ztl),
SNote that if e- 0, then agents have Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Unfortunately Cobb-
Douglas utility functions violate monotonicity at boundaries. Thus, in our example if e- 0 and
P- l, then utility is no longer increasing in consumption and the example will fail to satisfy [A-
1](2). Hence, we have e ~0.
14and it is easy to verify that uE (-,.,.,.) satisfies (A-1] (1) and (2). Finally, suppose
that the cost of public good z is given by c(z) - z. Thus, the cost function c(-)
satisfies [A-2].




then the choice problem for each agent, w, is given by
max(V 2,z)eCx(1} u(w'y'2'z)'
For each agent, w, this problem reduces to
maxye[05](1- W te) (2yfe).(2).
Using elementary calculus, it is easy to show that the mapping w~ ~(w,C,H)
corresponding to this collection of choice problems has a unique measurable
selection (y(.),2(-),z(-)) given for each w e W by
y(W)- 2(1tE)W-E
T(w) -~(1 f E)w - 2 E
z(w) -1.
The tax surplus function w ~ a(w,C,H) (see expression (22)) is then given by
6íw,C,H) - 2(w) -c(zíw))
- 4(lfe)w- 2e-1,





- .125 t .625e.
We can conclude, therefore, that the pair of inenus (C,H) E A x S given by
C-{(y,2)eK:t- 2y,05y52)and H-{1}
is revenue feasible and thus is contained in R.
Menus nrrd Public Sector Mechanisrns
Next we have our main result characterizing public sector mechanisms
in `Y n T' n Il in terms of inenu pairs in R.
Theorem 1
Suppose [A-1], [A-2], and [A-3] hold.
(1) Given any pair of inenus (C,H) e R, there exists a public sector
mechanism (y(.), t(.),z(.)) in `Y n I' n II such that
(y(w),t(y(w)),z(w)) E~(w,C,H) for all w e W.
(2) Given any public sector mechanism (y(.), t(.),z(.)) in `Y n r n II, there
exists a pair of inenus (C,H) e R such that
(Y(w),t(y(w)),z(w))e~(w,C,H)forall weW.
PROOF: (1) First, let (C,H) e R and let w-~ (y(w),2(w),z(w)) be a direct public
sector mechanism such that
(y(w),T(w),z(w)) e~(w,C,H) for all w e W and
16~(i(w) - c(z(w)))dP(w) ? 0.
W
Thus the direct tax function 2(-) finances public goods z(.) and
u(w,Y(w),t(w),z(w))- max(y T,z)ECxH u(w,y,i,z) for all we W.
Second, let y-~ C(y) be a set-valued mapping given by C(y) -{T E T:(y, t) e C}
and let t(.) : Y~ T be a(B(Y),B(T))-measurable function such that
t(y) e C(y) for all y E Y and t(y) - min(2 : t e C(y)},
Since the set-valued mapping y ~ C(y) ís B(Y)-measurable with nonempty
closed values in Y, such a function exists (see Bertsekas and Shreve (1978),
Proposition 7.33).y Moreover, since t(y) e C(y) for all y E Y, 0 5 t(y) 5 y for all
VEY.
Claim 1: (Y(~`'), T(~"),z(``')) -(Y(~`'), t(Y(~`')),z(w)) for all w E W.
If not then for some agent type w' E W, t(w') ~ t(y(w')). Since
t(y(w)) - min(2 : i e C(y(w))} for all w e W,
2(w') ~ t(y(w')) implies that 2(w') ~ t(y(w')). But given [A-1](2), 2(w') ~ t(y(w'))
contradicts the fact that
u(w,Y(w),2(w),z(w))-max(y i,z)ECxH u(w,y,t,z)
for each w. Thus, T(w) - t(y(w)) for all w E W, and thus,
J(t(Y(w)) -c(z(w)))dP(w) ? 0.
W
9Given [A-7](2), u(w,y, t(y),z) - max rEC(y) u(w,y, z, z) for all (w,y,z) e W x Y x G whcre t(. )
is any seleclion from y~ C(y) -(T :(y, t) e C}, C e A, such that t(y) - min{t : t e C(y)) .
17Claim 2: For each w e W,
u(w,Y(w),t(Y(~")),z(w))? u(w,y,t(y),z(w')) for all y e Y and w' E W.





Since (y", t(y"),z(w")) E C x H, (') contradicts the fact that
u(w,Y(w),T(w),z(w)) - max(y T,z)ECxH u(w,y,T,z)
for each w. Thus, the (y(.), t(.),z( )) is contained in `1' n i' n[7 and
(Y(``'), t(Y(w)),z(w)) E~(w,C,H) for all w e W,
(')
so that
u(w,y(w), t(y(w)),z(w)) - max(y T z)ECxH
u(w,y,T,z) for all w E W.
(2) Let (y(.),t(.),z(.)) e`Y n I' n II and let C- cl[Gr(t(.))], where cl denotes
closure and Gr(t(-)) is the graph of the indirect tax function t(.). Thus,
Gr(t(.)) -{(y,T) E Y x T: T- t(y)j.
Also, let H-{z} where z is that public goods vector in G such that
z(w) - z for all w E W.
Thus, H E S.
First note that since t(.) is defined on all of Y, projl,[cl[Gr(t(.))]] - Y. Note also
that since 0 5 t(y) 5 y for all y E Y, 0 5 T 5 y for all (y, t) E cl[Gr(t(.))]. Thus,
Cl[Gr(t('))] E n.
ÍóSecond, since C-c1[Gr(t(.))] it is easy to see that
and thus
(y(w), t(y(w))) e C for all w E W,
u(``',Y("'),KY(`")),z("'))5 max(v,t,z)eCxH u(w'y,t,z) for all we W.
Suppose now that for some agent type w' E W there is some 3-tuple
((y', í), z') e C x H such that
u(w',y(w'),t(Y(w'))~z(w )) ~ u(w'~Y'~j'~z ).
Since H-{z}, u(w',y',t',z')-u(w',y',t',z(w'))-u(w',y',t',z). Moreover, since
(y',2') is in the closure of the graph of t(-) and since u(w',-,-,z(w')) is
continuous on Y x T, there is an income and tax liabilíty pair (y,T) contained in
the graph of t(.) such that
Thus,
u(w,Y(w'),t(y(w')),z(w'p ~ u(w',y,T,z(w)).
u(w', y(w'), t(Y(w')),z(w')) ~ u(w', Y, t(Y),z(w7)
where t(y) - i. This contradicts the assumption that (y(.),t(.),z(-)) E`Y (i.e., the
assumption that (y(.),t(.),z(.)) is incentive compatible with z( ) a constant
function). Thus, since (y(w), t(y(w)),z(w)) e C x H for all w E W and since
u(w,Y(w),t(Y(w)),z(w))- max(y
t,z)eCxH
u(w,Y,t,z) for all we W,
we can conclude that (y(w), t(y(w)),z(w)) e~(w,C, H) for all w E W. Moreover,
since (y(-),t(y(.)),z(.)) is a measurable selection from ~(.,C,H), and since
J (t(Y(w)) - c(z(w)))dP(w) ? ~,
W
we can conclude that (C, H) -(cl[Gr(t(.))],{z)) e R Q.E.D.
194. The Existence of an Optimal Public Sector Mechanism
The Il-tax design problem with public goods (i.e., the public sector
mechanism design problem) can be written compactly as
max Ju(w,Y(w),t(Y(w)),z(w))du(w)
(Y(.),t(.),z(.))E`Yni'nCl W





We now have our main result stating necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of an optimal public sector mechanism. The proof of this
Theorem follows directly from Theorem ] and its proof.
Theorem 2
Suppose [A-1], [A-2], and [A-3] hold. Let It be any finite measure equivalent to
the probability measure P. Then the ft-tax design problem has a solution if and
only if the It-menu design problem has a solution. In particular, the following
statements are true:
(1) If the public sector mechanism (y(-), t(-),Z(.)) E Y' n i' n I7
maximizes J u(w,y(w),t(y(w)),z(w))dp(w) over `Pnfn[7,
W
then the pair of inenus (cl[Gr(t(-))],{z)), where cl[Gr(t(.))] is the closure of
the graph of the indirect tax function t(.) and z is the public goods vector
in G such that z(w) - z for all w E W, is contained in R and
maximizes Ju~(w,C,H)d~(w) over R.
W
(2) If (C,H) E R
maximizes Ju~(w,C,H)d~(w) over R,
W
20then the mechanism (y(.),t(.),z(.)) constructed in (a) and (b) below is
contained in `Y n I' n fl and
maximizes J u(w,y(w), t(y(w)),z(w))dli(w) over `Y n I' n II.
W
(a) y(.) is the direct income function and z(-) the direct public
goods function corresponding to a direct public sector
mechanism
(y(.),t(-),z(.)) e M(W,Y) x M(W,T) x M(W,G)
such that (y(w),T(w),z(w)) e~(w,C,H) for all w e W and
J(T(w)- c(Z(w)))dP(w) ? ~;
W
(b) t(.) : Y-~ T is a (B(Y),B(T))-measurable function such that
t(y) e C(y) for all y e Y and t(y) - min{2 : T e C(y)},
wherey ~ C(y) is the set-valued mapping given by
C(y) -{2 e T:(y, t) e C} for each y e Y.
Our next Theorem is our existence result for the menu design problem.
Theorem 3
Suppose [A-1], [A-2], and [A-3] hold. Then for each finite measure ft equivalent
to the probability measure P, there exists a pair of inenus (C`,H;) e R such that
Ju"(w,C`,Ht)d~(w)- max(C,I~eR J u~(`v'C'H)d~(`v)'
W W
PROOF: Since (C,H) ~ u~(w,C,H) is upper semicontinuous on A x S for each
w, (C,H) ~ J u~(w,C,H)du(w) is upper semicontinuous on A x S for each
W
finite measure ~. This follows from Fatou's Lemma (e.g., see Dudley (1989))
and the definition of upper semicontinuity. Thus, since R c A x S is compact,
the existence of an optimal pair of inenus (C`,H`) e R follows from the classical
Weierstrass Maximum Theorem. Q.E.D.
21Now we have the main result of the paper. This result states that the
general public sector mechanism design problem has a solution, and moreover,
that this solution is e-ffi~ient.
Theorem 4
Suppose [A-1], [A-2], and [A-3] hold. Then for each finite measure u equivalent
to the probability measure P, there exists a public sector mechanism
(Y`(.),t`(.),z`(~))E~r~rr,n
such that




Moreover, the public sector mechanism (y `(.),t`( .),z' (.)) E `Y n I' n Il is
efficient.
PROOF: By Theorem 3, for each P-equivalent finite measure lt there exists an
optimal pair of inenus (C`,H')E R.
By part (1) of Theorem 1 this implies that there exists a cnirPCnnnrjin~
optimal public sector mechanism (y `(.),t` (- ),z`(.)) E `Y n I'n CI.
By Proposition 1 such a mechanism is efficient Q.E.D.
5. Optimal Budget Balancing Public Sector Mechanisms
In this section, we identify a condition sufficient to guarantee that the
optimal public sector mechanism can be chosen so as to generate no excess
revenue (i.e., so that the optimal mechanism is budget balancing). The budget
surplus problem is, of course, well-known in the public finance literature (e.g.,
see Groves and Loeb (1975), Groves and Ledyard (1977), and Green and Laffont
(1977)).
We begin by considering the best response mapping
w -~ ~(w,C, H).
22corresponding to the menus (C,H). The closed set ~(w,C,H) is the type w
agent's set of optimal income, tax liability, and public goods 3-tuples given
menus (C,H). Since for all w e W and all (C, H) e A x S
~(w,C,H)cKxG,
and since K x G is a compact subset of Rk}2 (recall K is a compact subset of Rf
and G is a compact subset of Rt), the collection of best response mappings,
{~(.,C, H) :(C, H) e A x S},
is P-integrably bounded.~~






-: { j f(w)dP(w) :f(w) -(y(w),t(w),z(w)) e~(w,C,H) f1 w e W}.
W
(28)
~~Chus, there is a P-integrable, point-valued function g(-) :W-~ Rk}2 such that for any menus
(C, H) E A x S, ~xu 5 g(w) for all xe Rktz and w E W such that x E~(w, C, H).
23Proposition 5
(1) For each (C,H) e A x S, J~(w,C,H)dP(w) is a nonempty, compact subset
W




(2) The mapping (C,H) -~ J~(w,C,H)dP(w) is upper semicontinuous on
W
AxS.
PROOF: (1) It is easy to see that J~(w,C,H)dP(w) is nonempty and bounded.
W
To show that J[6(w,C,H)dP(w) is closed consider a sequence {xn)n in
W
J~(w,C,H)dP(w) converging to xeRkt2. Let (fn(.)}n be a corresponding
W
sequence of ineasurable selections from ~(.,C,H) such that for each n,
xn- Jfn(w)dP(w). Thus, limn Jfn(w)dP(w)-x. It follows from Fatou's
W W
Lemma in several dimensions (e.g., see Page (1991)), that there exists a
(E,B(1) x B(T) x B(G))-measurable selection f(.) from the mapping
such that
w ~ Ls{fn(w)}
x - J f(w)dP(w).
W
Since 4i(.,C,H) is closed-valued, Ls{fn(w)}c~(w,C,H) for all wEW. Thus,
f(w) e~(w,C,H) for all w e W, and thus
xe J~(w,C,H)dP(w).
W
~ ~Asubset Ee Y, is an atom ofthe probabiliry space (W, ï, P) iF P(E)10 and For all F e E such thaz F c E
either P(F) - 0 or P(E - F) - 0. The probabiliry spam (W, E, P) is a[omless ifit contains no atoms.
24The convexity of Jdi(w,C,H)dP(w) whenever (W,E,P) is atomless
W
follows directly from a classical result due to Richter (see Hildenbrand (7974),
Theorem 3, page 62).
(2) Let {(Cn, Hn )}n be a sequence in A x S converging to (C,H) e A x S. Also let
{xn }n be a sequence such that for each n
xn E J~(w,Cn,Hn)dP(w).
W
Corresponding to the sequence {xn}n there is a sequence of
(E, B(Y) x B(T) x B(G))-measurable functions {fn(-)}n such that for each n, fn (.)
is a selection from ~(.,Cn,Hn) and
xn - J fn (w)dP(w).
W
Since {xn}n is bounded, without loss of generality, we can assume that (xn}n
converges to some xeRk}2. Thus, limn Jfn(w)dP(w)-x. It follows from
W
Fatou's Lemma in several dimensions, that there exists a(E,B(Y) x B(T) x B(G))-
measurable selecHon f(-) from w~ Ls{fn(w)} such that
x - J f(w)dP(w).
W
Since the sequence (fn(.)}n is uniformly bounded on W, for each w e W there is
a subsequence {fnk (w)}k such that
f(w) - limnk fnk (w)
where fnk(w)E~(w,Cnk,Hnk).
25Since for each w E W, ~(w,.,.) is upper semicontinuous on A x S, and sínce
(Cn,Hn)-~(C,H), we have for each we W f(w)e~(w,C,H). Thus,
xe Jd~(w,C,H)dP(w) and we can conclude that (C,H)-~ J~(w,C,H)dP(w) is
W W
upper semicontinuous on A x S(see Theorem 1, p. 24 in Hildenbrand (1974)) .
Q.E.D.
Our last Theorem identifies a condition sufficient to guarantee that an
opHmal public sector mechanism can be found that generates no excess revenue.
Theorem 5
Suppose [A-1], [A-2], and [A-3] hold, and let (C`,H`) e R be optimal menus. If
J~(w,C`,H`)dP(w) is convex then there exits a corresponding optimal public
W
sector mechanism, (y `(.),t `(-),z `(.)) e 4' n I' n CI, that generates no excess
revenue. That is, there exists (y `(.), t` (.),z `(.)) e `Y n i' n CI such that
J(t `(Y a (w))-c(z `(w)))dP(w) - 0.
W
PROOF: Let (y'(-),2'(-),z'(-)) e M(E,~ x M(E,T) x M(E,G) be a direct mechanism
such that
(Y'(w), í(w), z'(w)) e ~(w,C`, H`) for all w e W,
and
j (t'(w) -c(z'(w)))dP(w) ~ 0. (29)
W
Thus, the direct mechanism (y'(-),T'(-),z'(.)) generates excess revenue.
Since H` -(z`} for some public goods vector z` e G and since z'(w) - z`
for all w e W, (29) can be rewritten as
J 2'(w)dP(w) ~ c(z`).
W
(30)
26Now take the menu C` and for each n form the menu Cn` by
multiplying the tax liability corresponding to each income level by (1- 1).
n
Thus, each (yn, 2n ) E Cn ` is given by (y, (] - 1)t) for some (y, 2) E C`. Given
n
assumpHon [A-1](2), for any n and any measurable selection (yn('),2n('),zn( ))
from ~6(-,Cn`,H'), we havet2
u(w, Yn(w),2n (w),zn(w)) ? u(w, Y'(w), (1- 1)t'(w),z(w)) n
~ u(w,Y(~`')~t'(w)~z (w))-
(31)
Thus, for anV n and any measurable selection (yn(.),2n(.),zn(-)) from
~(.,Cn',H') it must be true that
J2n (w)dP(w) ~ c(z`).
W
In particular, if for some n
J 2n (w)dP(w) ? c(z`),
W
then it follows that (Cn',H`) E R. Given (31) this would contradict the
optimality of (C`,H`).
Now observe that {(Cn',H`)}n converges to (C`,H`). Let {xn}n be a
sequence such that for each n
xn E J~(w,Cn',H`)dP(w).
W
Corresponding to the sequence (xn}n there is a sequence of
(E,B(1) x B(T) x B(G))-measurable functions {fn(.)}n such that for each n,
fn(')-(Yn(')~2n(')~zn(')) is a measurable selection from ~(-,Cn`,H') and
12Noic that for each n we have zn (w) - z' for all w e W.
27xn - jfn(w)dP(w)-( JYn(w)dP(~`')~ JTn(w)dP(w)~ Jzn(w)dP(w))~
W W W W
For all n, we have
J Tn(w)dP(w) c c(z`).
W
(32)
Without loss of generality, assume that (xn)n converges to some xeRkf2.
Thus, limn J fn(w)dP(w) - x. Again it follows from Fatou's Lemma in several
W
dimensions and the upper semicontinuity of ~(w,.,-) on A x S for each w e W
that there exists a measurable selection f(.)-(y(.),T(-),z(.)) from ~(.,C',H`)
such that
x- Jf(w)dP(w) - ( J Y(w)dP(w), j 2(w)dP(w), Jz(w)dP(w)).
W W W W




x'-( Jy'(w)dP(w), J t'(w)dP(w), Jz'(w)dP(w))e j di(w,C},H~)dP(w)
W W W W
with
and we have
J T'(w)dP(w) ~ c(z`),
W
x-( JY(w)dP(w), jT(w)dP(w), Jz(w)dP(w))e J~(w,C`,H`)dP(w)
W W W W
(33)
28with
f t(w)dP(w) 5 c(z').
w




and a corresponding measurable selection, (y'(.),t`(-),z'( )), from
~( ,C',H`) such that
J 2 " (w)dP(w) - c(z') .
4N
Following the directions given in part (2) of Theorem 2 and using the
direct public sector mechanism (y' (.),2 `O,z ` (-)), we can construct an optimal
public sector mechanism (y `(-), t`(-),z `(.)) e`f' n T' n I7 such that
j(t ~ (Y ` (w)) - c(z ~ (w)))dP(w) - 0.
W
Q.E.D.
By part (1) of Proposition 5, J~(w,C',H')dP(w) will be convex if the
W
probability space of agent types is atomless. In addition Jd~(w,C`,H`)dP(w)
W
will be convex if the best response mapping w-~ d~(w,C~,H`) correspondíng to
the oatimal menus (C`,H') is single-valued.
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